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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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Many goods and services required for government operations can be provided through 
commercial markets.  Public officials, therefore, face a number of “make-or-buy” decisions.  
Transactions Cost Economics (TCE) offers a useful foundation for characterizing “make-or-buy” 
decisions, which this paper explores.  Our dual objective is to synthesize key principles of TCE 
and to apply TCE to federal outsourcing.  One especially useful insight is that transaction costs 
vary widely, and depend in known ways upon the attributes of the outsourcing action.  This 
means, among other things, that one size should not fit all in outsourcing decision processes. 
                                                
1 Primary contact for administrative and editorial matters. 
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DISCLAIMER: This paper contains judgments and conclusions of the authors.  It does not 
necessarily reflect any policy or position held by the Departments of Navy or Defense. 
Introduction 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In launching the reinventing government movement, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) 
renewed interest in reviewing government support activities to assess whether savings might 
exist from outsourcing more government work to the private sector. At the federal level, these 
assessments have taken the form of public-private competitions governed by OMB Circular A-
76, published by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB, 2003). 
A key insight of Transactions Cost Economics (TCE) is that a firm’s boundaries are 
principally defined by its “make-or-buy” decisions (Coase, 1937). Similarly, the boundaries of the 
US Military are increasingly shaped by public-private (make-or-buy) competitions. Another key 
insight of TCE is that while production-cost savings are necessary to warrant outsourcing, they 
are not sufficient. Besides the usual quality, schedule and security concerns,2 the risk of 
opportunistic behavior and the often considerable costs of managing external transactions need 
to be factored into the calculations. 
The Department of Defense uses the term “Competitive Sourcing” to describe its public-
private competitions.3 A recent study by Gansler & Lucyshyn (2004) reveals that since 1995, 
competitive sourcing initiatives have involved more than 65,000 Department of Defense (DoD) 
civilian positions and yielded an average estimated savings of 44 percent of baseline costs, for 
a cumulative total of $11.2 billion dollars. Although contractors won a slight majority of these 
competitions (56 percent), the trend appears to favor public providers. By 2003, in-house 
bidders won nearly twice as many competitions as contractors. 4  
                                                
2 Enterprise operations involve information, some of which is proprietary, classified or otherwise sensitive.  
Close coordination with an outside supplier of goods or services involves the exchange of information, 
some of which is sensitive.  Passing this information outside corporate boundaries accordingly decreases 
ability to control its dissemination.  Thus, involving outside suppliers involves risks of compromising 
corporate (or government) secrets. 
3 Table 2 lists the top 15 items outsourced by the Pentagon from 1998 to 2003. 
4 The number of bids won by the in-house “most efficient organization” in many cases reflects costs that 
do not properly account for capital expenses—costs that are generally sunk, and which public-sector 
organizations have difficulty estimating.  However, the A-76 process inserts an aspect of competition in 
providing the services in question; therefore, these public-private competitions can, and often do, result in 
savings to the government regardless of who wins. In testimony to the Congress in 2000, the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) reported Department of Defense estimates that 286 of the A-76 competitions 
completed since 1995—involving some 10,660 government positions—may have generated savings of 
$290 million in fiscal year 1999 (General Accounting Office, 2000). Part of these estimated cost savings 
occurred even when the government supplier retained control. Although difficult to calculate, it is likely 
even more savings were generated from newly contestable internal government markets—or the threat of 
entry—introduced by A-76 competitions in federal operations (Baumol, et al., 1982). Notably absent from 
these calculations, however, is an explicit account of the costs of conducting the competitions, and the 
transaction costs associated with implementing newly redesigned programs and the burden of ongoing 
contract administration—including costs of negotiating, writing, monitoring and enforcing federal 
contracts. This is a central theme that is addressed in the rest of the paper. 
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Along with successive waves of defense acquisition reforms, the issue of competitive 
sourcing has become a central fact-of-life. What fraction of the defense budget should 
government “make” (or in-source) in the public sector, and what fraction should it “buy” (or out-
source) in private markets?5 TCE offers a powerful analytical framework to help answer 
government’s make-or-buy decisions, and in the case of outsourcing, to guide the type of 
contract.  
TCE views organizations as a web of contractual relationships. Each relationship—the 
acquisition of an input, employment of a worker, the exchange of a product or service between 
supplier and customer—is a transaction. Understanding the basic characteristics of a 
transaction turns out to be the key to answering the “make-or-buy” decision.6 
Two costs typically drive an organization’s “make-or-buy” decisions: production costs 
and transaction costs. Conventional economic analysis focuses on production costs (economies 
of scale and scope, learning curves, etc.). The “buy” (or outsourcing) option is routinely 
prescribed whenever external production costs are substantially lower than internal production 
costs. Although recognizing the importance of production cost savings in the decision to 
outsource, TCE emphasizes another key factor: transaction costs (e.g., search and information 
costs, bargaining, decision and contracting costs, and monitoring and enforcement costs).7 As 
Oliver Williamson—regarded as the father of TCE—rhetorically queries: 
What […] does zero transaction costs mean? All of the relevant information is freely 
available and can be costlessly processed by the participants? Comprehensive 
contracting is feasible? Actions can be costlessly monitored? Decisions will always be 
made in a benign way? (1999, p.316)  
Some transaction costs typically faced by organizations dealing with outside suppliers 
are the costs associated with: source selection, periodic competition and renegotiation, contract 
management, and measuring and monitoring performance.  
Coase (1937) was among the first to discuss how, since market transactions are costly 
to manage, “by forming an [internal support] organization and allowing some authority to direct 
resources [internally], certain [transaction] costs are saved” (p. 392).  However, the cure—
vertically integrating transactions inside the firm (or “make”)—can be worse than the disease.   
Examples of transaction costs that occur inside an organization include the costs of 
managing and monitoring employees and purchasing inputs. In fact, supplanting the market 
                                                
5 Note that if bureaucratic power increases with the size of a bureau (as suggested by Mueller, 1987), 
then Niskanen’s (1968) theory of budget-maximizing bureaucracy lends support to Wagner’s (1976) 
prediction that the public sector share of national income will tend to rise over time—in this example there 
would appear to be a built-in bias favoring the “make” decision.  
6 Non-core business transactions commonly outsourced by private companies include: IT services, back-
office accounting, benefits management, customer service, engineering design, help-desk management 
and operations, human resource management, legal services, facilities management, physical and 
electronic security, printing services, mailroom management and operations, payroll services, some 
procurement activities, secretarial and administrative support, internal audit and accounting, temporary 
staffing, transportation, distribution and shipping services, and warehouse management and operation. 
7 Transaction costs include costs of seeking out buyers and sellers and arranging, policing and enforcing 
agreements or contracts. 
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price mechanism requires internal coordination that involves some risks. These include the risk 
of internal opportunistic behavior (costly lobbying for higher salaries or budget increases), multi-
tasking (“what gets measured gets done”), and sub-optimization (success achieved at lower 
levels at the expense of the overall welfare of the organization).  
The TCE literature evaluates both internal and external transactions to help guide make-
or-buy decisions. While the literature focuses almost exclusively on business decisions, the goal 
of this paper is to integrate and apply key principles of TCE to guide government decisions.  
Government make-or-buy decisions mostly take the form of public-private competitions, 
or “competitive sourcing.” The next section offers an overview of competitive sourcing. Section 3 
provides a brief review and synthesis of the TCE literature. Section 4 discusses new insights 
generated by TCE that can help guide government’s competitive-sourcing decisions, as well as 
its choice of contract type. Section 5 offers a useful table that summarizes our results along with 
a few policy recommendations. 
2.  COMPETITIVE SOURCING 
Every organization has to decide how much of its production and support activities will 
be conducted within the boundaries of the organization (“make”), and how much will be 
performed outside the organization (“buy”).  
Table 1 illustrates the outcome of over two thousand competitive-sourcing competitions 
conducted by the US Military over the period 1978-1994 (Trunkey, et al., 1996). The 
competitions resulted in nearly an even split between continued public provision and decisions 
to outsource.  
TABLE 1. Public-Private A-76 Competitions in the Military
GOGO=Government Owned Government Operated Trunkey, et al., 1996
COCO=Contractor Owned Contractor Operated
% GOGO % COCO
COMPS WINS WINS
DoD 54 54 46
Army 466 48 52
Air Force 760 60 40
Marines 44 41 59
Navy 807 43 57
49 51
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The typical competitive sourcing process can be broken down into six steps: 1) Identify 
Functions to be Competed; 2) Evaluate the Functions to be Competed (define baseline costs 
and performance); 3) Prepare a Comprehensive Request for Proposals (RFP); 4) Identify 
Potential Vendors (perform due diligence); 5) Select a Vendor (or multiple vendors); 6) 
Negotiate a Contract (including price and performance targets and incentives for improvement).  
The first two steps involve defining the product or service; the next two involve 
evaluating alternative sources of supply (public and private); and the last two focus on choosing 
a provider. TCE emphasizes a final step, occasionally overlooked in the make-or-buy decision 
process: the costs of managing the contract, including evaluating and monitoring performance.  
It always helps to look forward and reason back. If it appears managing the contract 
(including future competitions and/or renegotiations), and evaluating and monitoring 
performance are likely to be costly (in terms of dollars or disputes), then this expense should be 
taken into account in the original make-or-buy decision, as well as in negotiating the contract 
type.  
OMB Circular A-76 governs the military’s competitive-sourcing initiatives. It requires the 
classification of all activities into two categories: “commercial” or “inherently governmental.”  
Attachment A (Inventory Process) guides the selection of government activities deemed 
“commercial” in nature. Commercial activities are those “subject to the forces of competition.” 
Attachment B (Public-Private Competition) specifies the competitive-sourcing process.8  Finally, 
Attachment C (Calculating Public-Private Competition Costs) specifies the rules and procedures 
for cost calculations.   
The A-76 Competitive Sourcing Process in Brief 
The competitive sourcing process governed by OMB Circular A-76 consists of several 
stages summarized below: 
a) Create an inventory of agency activities, classify them as commercial or 
governmental, and determine how to bundle the competition(s).   
b) Announce intention to undertake a competitive sourcing study, both to the affected 
government work force and to potential commercial sources. 
c) Develop and announce the terms of the competition to include expectations 
(Performance Work Statement, PWS), various study teams, and a quality-
assurance plan (QASP).  Specify the criteria for source selection. 
d) Issue a solicitation, or Request for Proposal (RFP), seeking bids from the 
commercial sector. 
e) Develop the in-house alternative.  This consists of a management plan, cost 
estimate, performance plan, and transition plan from the current organization to the 
“Most Efficient Organization” (MEO).  This alternative is automatically one of the 
finalists. 
                                                
8 Actually, at least two competition processes—the streamlined process is discussed in Attachment B, 
Section C, and the standard process in Section D. 
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f) Compare the public (in-source) alternative with qualifying private (out-source) 
proposals both in terms of cost and in meeting the terms of the PWS.  
g) Award the contract (issuing agreement) after appeal if applicable. The decision to 
out-source requires that the private alternative offer cost savings of at least 10 
percent or $10 million below the MEO, whichever is less. 
h) Transition to the in-house organization (if applicable) or to the winning commercial 
source. 
i) Conduct post-award contract administration (if applicable) and quality assurance. 
 
The concept of competitive sourcing takes many of its lessons from the private sector. 
There are a number of very good reasons for private firms to consider outsourcing, among them 
are: production costs, “agency” costs and “influence” costs.” 
A. Production Costs  
Firms specialize in certain goods and services because they have a competitive (or 
comparative) advantage at performing them.  As they specialize, firms increase their proficiency 
(work down their learning curve) and continuously improve. Within a competitive market, firms 
earn rewards for those improvements, and are motivated to operate at the most efficient scale.9  
Competitive markets provide powerful incentives for participating firms to discover and 
produce product mixes that minimize costs. That is, firms in a competitive market are also 
motivated to fully realize economies of scope.10  This can boost profits and fend off rivals.  The 
more competitive the market, the more firms are motivated to pass on savings to customers.  
Prices charged in competitive markets are close to marginal costs, and are constantly driven 
down due to competition, as well as economies of scale, scope and learning.11  
A critical task that faces every organization is to identify its core competencies, those 
activities in which they have a competitive (or comparative) advantage. Internal production of 
non-core competencies is unlikely to be efficient when compared to what is available in the 
market. In general, production rates are too small to fully realize available economies of scale.  
Only by happy coincidence would the organization’s demand for goods of a particular type 
correspond with the most efficient scale or scope of production.  Finally, in-house production 
                                                
9 Firms in perfectly competitive markets will move toward the lowest point of their long-run average cost 
curve in pursuit of profit.  That is, these firms can be expected to take full advantage of economies of 
scale. 
10 If two products can be produced together more cheaply than they can be produced separately, then 
there are economies of scope.  Opportunities for economies of scale and scope pretty much define the 
firm’s natural “horizontal boundaries.” 
11 The difference between marginal cost and price varies inversely with the price elasticity of demand for 
the vendor’s product.  An inherent feature of competitive markets is the availability of a large number of 
close substitutes for any firm’s product.  Therefore, price elasticities of demand are quite high, and the 
difference between marginal cost and price are correspondingly quite small.  (In the limiting case of 
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may only be required and/or operate intermittently, limiting the opportunities to exploit further 
economies from learning-by-doing.12 
B. “Agency” and “Influence” Costs  
In-house production is synonymous with “sole source.” With captive customers, a 
monopoly government activity has little incentive to cut costs or improve product quality. The 
“agency” problem involves finding creative (low-cost) mechanisms that align incentives to 
induce an activity to perform diligently and in ways consistent with the overall goals and 
objectives of the organization.13   
Management oversight is one such mechanism, but it carries a cost. Oversight requires 
time and effort and, therefore, a commitment of resources. Moreover, it is often associated with 
costly lobbying efforts to influence decisions that favor one part of the organization at the 
expense of others. Influence activities can increase costs and undermine the effectiveness of an 
organization, leading to sub-optimization. Outsourcing part of the production chain may avoid 
some agency and influence costs that are part of internal transaction costs. 
3.  TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) 
Organizations tend to specialize in those “core” activities in which they have a 
comparative advantage, and “transact” with outside suppliers (or out-source) to acquire other 
goods and services. A key contribution of TCE is to introduce the nontrivial costs of managing 
these transactions into the “make-or-buy” decision. The question is whether resource inputs or 
intermediate activities should be produced internally (vertically integrated), or should be “out-
sourced”—i.e., purchased in spot markets or contracted through suppliers. The two costs that 
drive the “make-or-buy” decision in TCE are production costs and transaction costs. Answers to 
the make-or-buy decision ultimately define the boundaries of an organization.   
Figure 1 offers a simple “make-or-buy decision tree.” Here the prescription to in-source 
(make) or out-source (buy) accounts for both production and transaction costs. For instance, if 
the organization is conducting an activity where there exists “LOWER” external production 
costs, and out-sourcing would involve “LOW” transaction costs (TC), then the policy decision is 
to “BUY” (or out-source). The higher the expected transaction costs (to manage the supply 
relationship), the lower external production cost (or the greater production cost savings) must be 





                                                
12 With extended production runs, firms become more proficient with the processes involved, and, 
therefore, able to achieve lower cost. As Besanko (2000, p. 91) puts it, “cost advantages […] flow from 
accumulating experience and know-how.” 
13 This is frequently referred to as the “principal-agent problem.”  Methods to address it are sometimes 
grouped as “agency theory” (Kreps, 1990; Besanko, 2000). 
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In TCE, the decision to outsource depends on an expectation of positive net savings, 
where: Net Savings = Production Cost Savings + Transaction Cost Savings. In Figure 1, if 
external production costs are “HIGHER” than internal production costs, and external transaction 
costs are also “HIGH,” then the policy decision is to “MAKE” (or in-source). However, it is 
possible for an internal production cost advantage to be offset by sufficiently high internal 
transaction costs. In this case, if “HIGHER” external production costs can be offset by 
sufficiently “LOW” external transaction costs, it might still pay to “BUY” (or out-source).14 Higher 
external production costs could still look like a bargain to an organization if that organization 
suffers from sufficiently high internal transaction costs to conduct that activity. 
Two key components of the “make-or-buy” decision are highlighted in TCE: coordination 
and motivation. The issue of coordination arises from the economic opportunity for 
specialization and exchange. Traditional economic analysis focuses on productive (cooperative) 
exchanges between parties that specialize in different activities. These transactions often 
generate substantial gains for the parties involved. The gain or “surplus” generated through 
specialization and exchange can take the form of more and better output, delivered more 
quickly, and with fewer resources. TCE recognizes these potential gains, but also acknowledges 
the dark side of the coordination problem—motivation.  
TCE predicts parties involved in a transaction may benefit from cooperation and, 
thereby, generate a surplus. However, since they are assumed to be self-interested and 
opportunistic, they will not necessarily have the motivation to do so—particularly when specific 
assets15 are involved and information is imperfect (incomplete or uncertain) and asymmetric.  
                                                
14 At first glance, introducing transaction costs into the mix suggests lower external production costs (or 
positive production cost savings) are necessary but no longer sufficient to justify outsourcing. Now we can 
see that production cost savings may not even be necessary to justify outsourcing! 
15 Asset specificity comes in a variety of flavors: human, location, physical, etc. These are assets that 
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The interaction of opportunism with imperfect and asymmetric information raises the 
possibility of unproductive bargaining/influence or rent-seeking activities.16 The ultimate 
outcome—a balance of productive efforts and unproductive bargaining—depends on the 
characteristics of the transaction and the incentive structures that govern the parties involved.17  
In TCE, the successful resolution of resource-allocation problems rests on designing 
mechanisms (markets, contracts, organizations, etc.) that allow opportunistic individuals to 
overcome their collective-action problems in pursuit of gains from exchange (Williamson & 
Masten, 1999). 
A. Coordination Difficulties 
Efficient production requires extensive synchronization of a number of complex activities.  
This is especially true in the practice of “lean” production, featuring “just-in-time” deliveries with 
attendant reduction in inventory costs.  The more complex the transaction, the more difficult 
(costly) coordination with an outside enterprise will be. There may be more commonality of 
objectives between two divisions of the same enterprise than with an outside firm.  Also, any 
disagreements about deliveries, schedules and similar issues are generally settled more quickly 
and in ways more suitable to the enterprise if it has authority over all parties.  (One way to have 
that authority is to vertically integrate and produce everything in-house.) 
B. Motivation Difficulties   
Out-sourcing important parts of one’s business means depending on the chosen 
supplier.  This dependence may be of trivial importance.  For example, the purchase of paper 
clips involves a one-time transaction for office supplies.18  If a paper-clip source proves 
unsatisfactory for some reason, it’s readily possible to find another supplier.  
On the other hand, outsourcing a major management information system involves a 
long-term, highly-complex relationship. During the process of executing the agreement, the 
supplier acquires expertise in the specific system, which confers a form of human asset 
specificity.   
At some point, the relationship is transformed from a customer operating in a competitive 
marketplace with a number of suppliers to a relationship between a single buyer and single 
seller. At this point, close-in bilateral bargaining replaces the impersonal (arms-length) 
arrangements of the competitive marketplace.   
Outsourcing relationships of this type entail a basic transformation of the supplier from 
competitive bidder (prior to source selection) to sole supplier (after source selection). Having 
one supplier with unique expertise (human and physical asset specificity) confers monopoly 
                                                
16 The concept of unproductive bargaining and rent-seeking is usually attributed to Tullock (1971), 
Krueger (1974), and Bhagwati (1980) (also Tullock, 1993). A key insight of this literature is that costly 
bilateral bargaining by two parties for a bigger share of the surplus they jointly create can dissipate or 
even eliminate that surplus (Tullock, 1971).  
17 There are other factors as well. For example, Wolff and Reed (2000) find significant evidence that, inter 
alia, the nature of, and access to, assets in a joint venture are important in predicting the balance of 
positive sum (productive) and zero sum (unproductive) outcomes for the participants. 
18 Actually, a series of one-time purchases of paper clips. 
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power, especially if there are no close substitutes for this particular contractor’s services.  
Accordingly, the customer is now vulnerable to “opportunistic behavior”19 from the contractor.  
Unforeseen circumstances may prompt large charges for special services for which there are no 
readily available substitutes.20 The supplier may, in fact, exploit its power in the relationship to 
renegotiate the basic agreement to the buyer’s disadvantage, threatening to dissolve the 
agreement.  The TCE literature refers to this as a “hold-up.”21   
Whereas out-sourcing opens possibilities of production cost savings, it exposes the 
organization to the costs of managing the out-sourcing relationship and to the risks of bad 
(opportunistic) behavior on the part of out-sourcing partners.   
C. Relationship Specific Investments (Investments in Transaction-Specific Assets) 
Relation-specific investments can improve the efficiency of some transactions. 
Investments in specific assets can take on a variety of characteristics, including: 
Site Specificity: e.g., investments that locate the supplier’s production facility close to 
its customer; 
Physical-Asset Specificity: e.g., specialized investments by the supplier (in plant 
and/or equipment tailored to the customer’s needs) that are much less profitable if shifted to 
serve other customers;  
Human-Asset Specificity: e.g., specialized investments by the supplier’s work force (in 
skills and knowledge) oriented toward the primary customer’s needs that are less valuable in 
transactions with other customers. 
Dedicated-Asset specificity: e.g., investments in excess capacity which provide a 
contingency in the event of a surge in demand. 
Relation-specific investments increase risks to both parties. Having made specialized 
investments, the supplier becomes the most efficient provider, and thus can potentially raise its 
price—and still remain the least-cost supplier.  At the same time, if the supplier makes specific 
investments in assets that are only valuable in the context of its relationship with a specific 
buyer, then this makes it more vulnerable to that customer.  If parties to the transaction behave 
opportunistically, they can capture the value of investments made by the other. For example, 
either party can “hold up” the other by threatening to change the terms of the relationship. So, 
whereas relation-specific investments increase the total gains from the outsourcing 
arrangement, they also increase the risks of opportunistic behavior in which either party can 
hold up the other. The danger is that if neither party feels like it can recover the full costs of its 
                                                
19 Williamson (1996) defines “opportunism” as “self-interest seeking with guile.” 
20 Besanko (2000) and others have labeled the transition from one prospective buyer and many sellers to 
one buyer and one seller, from competitive market to a one-on-one relationship as the “fundamental 
transformation.”  This transformation occurs, at least to a certain extent, after the completion of every 
source-selection process. 
21 An even worse case is the possibility that a holdup might be unilaterally executed.  According to 
Besanko (2000), “a holdup problem arises when a party in a contractual arrangement exploits the other 
party’s vulnerability due to relationship-specific assets.” 
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investment in the relationship/transaction (say through a continuation or renewal of the 
contract), then those efficiency-generating investments will not be made, possibly resulting in 
higher costs, schedule delays and lower quality.22  The Appendix provides a notional example 
illustrating the vulnerabilities of both parties in an outsourcing relationship featuring a high 
degree of asset specificity. 
D. Resolving the Hold-Up Problem 
While corporate partnerships and relation-specific investments increase the benefits to 
both parties, they make both vulnerable to opportunistic behavior, or a holdup, by the other 
party.  Vulnerability to these events can be significantly decreased through well-crafted 
contracts.  However, contracting (a) involves expenditure of resources, and (b) cannot 
completely eliminate risks associated with opportunistic behavior from partners.23 
The process of contracting includes drafting the relevant documents, negotiating a 
version of the contract that is signed, taking actions to enforce that contract, and renegotiating 
when needed.  These tasks entail, at minimum, the services of skilled people who develop local 
knowledge of the specific business relationship.  There may also be costs associated with 
litigation, to include both direct (e.g., monetary) and indirect (e.g., time delay) components.  
Furthermore, the basic contract may well need considerable administrative and management 
attention throughout its life, even if full-scale renegotiation is not undertaken.  Accomplishing 
these tasks satisfactorily involves expenditure of resources and management attention.  These 
“transactions” costs can negate a significant portion of the savings involved with outsourced 
production. 
That the future is not amenable to perfect prediction is a well-known fact of life.  The 
obvious implication is that a contract cannot foresee all possible contingencies throughout the 
period of its execution.  That’s true regardless of the skill of the legal staff and the expertise of 
the contracting personnel.24  In some cases, this is not worrisome, as, say, for the one-time 
purchase of paper clips.  However, in long-term, complex outsourcing relationships, this may 
prove very costly during the execution of the contract. This problem is further complicated when 
there is asymmetric information.   
Even the enforcement of clearly written contracts may be problematic.  It may be difficult 
to specify, measure, and demonstrate material breach of contract.  Furthermore, it is impossible 
to foresee all situations in which a contracting party might wish to demonstrate that breach. 
Because contracts cannot completely hedge against risks of opportunistic behavior, 
other risk-reduction measures may prove advantageous.  The organization out-sourcing an 
                                                
22 The result of opportunistic behavior may be adverse selection, ex ante choice of an inferior option (e.g., 
production technology), or moral hazard—increasing risk that if a relationship-specific investment is 
made, that the other party will exploit the terms of the contract to “hold them up.” For example, changes in 
specifications are frequently used by contractors as an excuse for raising prices and profits under 
government contracts, especially when specific investments by the contractor create a barrier to the entry 
of other competitors. 
23 Costs associated with contracting and the holdup risks remaining are major components of 
“transactions costs.” 
24 This is a manifestation of what’s sometimes called “bounded rationality.” 
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activity may retain some in-house (perhaps standby) capability to provide the good or service in 
question.25  This, and similar measures, could enhance bargaining position in the event of 
renegotiation or contract-enforcement actions.   
Changing the ownership of assets associated with relation-specific investments is 
another strategy that can reduce the scope for opportunistic behavior. For example, this may 
take the form of government-furnished equipment in some federal transactions or GOCO 
(“Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated”).  However, such hedging measures also entail 
costs, and can likewise dissipate the potential gains from outsourcing. 
The conventional wisdom in the transaction costs literature is that the decision to out-
source should not be taken lightly.  While the potential production-cost savings may well be 
tempting, there are associated costs and risks, albeit less obvious.  They are less important 
(and might be negligible) for simple, one-time transactions where alternate suppliers are readily 
available.  They can be critically important when the out-sourcing arrangement is such that there 
is only one supplier readily available in a complex and lengthy relationship.   
Hence, the decision to out-source must weigh production cost savings against the costs 
and risks associated with a critical source of supply being outside the firm’s control.  Those are 
generally referred to as the transaction costs of the out-sourcing relationship.  Thus, out-
sourcing is preferred only if the total costs are less than the costs of production with the firm’s 
(in-house, organic) assets.  That is, a firm should out-source only if:   
Net Savings = Production Cost Savings + Transaction Cost Savings > 0. 
4.  IMPLICATIONS OF TCE FOR COMPETITIVE SOURCING 
A fundamental insight of TCE is the importance of uncovering both production and 
transaction costs associated with the “make-or-buy” decision.  The policies and procedures that 
govern competitive sourcing appear in OMB Circular A-76. A summary of the steps involved in 
conducting these public-private competitions appears in Table 1.26 TCE reveals key 
characteristics of transactions that make them “good” or more “challenging” candidates for out-
sourcing. 
A. “Good” Candidates for Outsourcing  
If a transaction requires little in the way of specific assets (no hold-up problem), and 
involves a product or service that is: a) standard and well-defined (IFB), b) easy to measure 
(limited complexity and mild information asymmetry), c) routinely used (recurring/frequent 
purchases), d) not subject to change (limited demand uncertainty), and e) is offered by 
competing suppliers, then there is little room for negotiation (price and performance are market-
driven), and the marginal benefit of unproductive bargaining (or opportunistic behavior) is nearly 
zero. With little room for bargaining over such routine and uncomplicated transactions, 
substantial production and transaction cost savings can be expected from out-sourcing, or from 
purchasing directly in spot markets (say over the Internet). Moreover, since administrative, 
incentive, and enforcement costs tend to be low for standard goods and services produced in 
                                                
25 This is sometimes called “tapered integration” and is related to the concept of “contestable markets.” 
26 The results outlined in the next two sections were generated by a simple mathematical game theory 
model of out-sourcing that incorporates key principles of TCE (See Melese, F. & Franck, R., 2003). 
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competitive markets, the marginal cost of engaging in the transaction is small, and the marginal 
cost of unproductive effort is high. This encourages greater effort and investment in the 
transaction and, ceteris paribus, tends to generate a larger surplus, S, or a higher return to out-
sourcing.  
In general, the less complex and uncertain a transaction, the easier it is to write an 
explicit contract that covers all relevant contingencies. Moreover, the lower the administrative 
and enforcement costs of that contract, the higher the expected marginal cost of ex-post 
bargaining or opportunistic behavior, and the lower the expected return from that activity. This 
reduces the scope for optimal ex-post bargaining, thus lowering transaction costs associated 
with outsourcing. The favorable characteristics of these so-called “good” candidates tend to 
encourage greater productive effort that in turn contributes to a larger surplus enjoyed by both 
parties, increasing the returns from out-sourcing. 
B. More “Challenging” Candidates for Out-sourcing  
More challenging candidates include transactions that involve a non-standard (or highly 
differentiated) product or service, and thus take place in a bilateral, contractual setting. In this 
case, assuming no specific assets are required, the results (bargaining or opportunistic 
behavior, effort or investment in the relationship, and surplus generated) depend on the degree 
of contractual ambiguity governing the transaction, as well as on any administrative and 
enforcement costs involved. However, as complexity, uncertainty, and opportunism due to 
specific investments increase, so does the marginal benefit of bargaining or ex-post re-
negotiation. This increased risk results in higher external transaction costs that need to be offset 
by more substantial production cost savings in order to justify out-sourcing.  
Productive investment (or effort) involves two types of assets: general and specific. The 
greater the ratio of specific assets to total investments required in the relationship, the greater 
the risk of “hold-up.” Moreover, as the threat of bilateral dependency increases, the more 
incomplete the contract becomes (and the lower the penalty for reneging or renegotiation), the 
marginal cost to each party of engaging in unproductive bargaining or influence activities 
becomes lower. In the face of incomplete contracting, the hold-up problem poses a hazard 
Williamson calls “maladaptation.” The risk of maladaptation is captured here as an increase in 
the return to both parties in unproductive bargaining or influence activities. As the marginal 
return to bargaining increases and the marginal cost decreases, a greater amount of 
unproductive bargaining, and a lower productive effort or investment can be expected—which 
erodes the surplus that can be enjoyed by both parties to the transaction.  
Any time ex-ante competitive bidding among suppliers is transformed into an ex-post, 
bilaterally dependent relationship, additional governance structures may be required to induce 
cooperative adaptation. The challenge is to write a contract with enough precision to encourage 
desired performance, but enough flexibility to allow productive adaptation (adjustments), as 
circumstances require. But in the case of complex transactions and uncertain outcomes, 
“bounded rationality” precludes comprehensive ex-ante contracting (contracts are inherently 
incomplete) which raises the possibility of gains from (unproductive) ex-post, opportunistic 
renegotiation (e.g., the “hold-up” problem).  
Contracting, therefore, offers an imperfect solution to opportunism.  Additional 
governance mechanisms (rules and regulations, GOCO, etc.) can help settle disputes and 
adapt to new conditions.  Likewise, ex ante efforts are useful for screening reliability and 
reputation or to safeguard and protect transaction-specific investments. These structures can 
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include anything from agreements to share and verify cost and performance information through 
incentive contracts (e.g., sharing gains of continuous process improvement), to government 
ownership of facilities and tooling to reduce the potential for opportunism, to the careful crafting 
of dispute settlement mechanisms.  
If such agreements turn out to be too costly to implement and enforce—or 
“maladaptation hazards” are too great—then out-sourcing can give way to in-sourcing, or 
vertical integration. When asset specificity, bounded rationality, and opportunism make 
contracting problems too difficult or costly, these problems can be relieved by internalizing 
transactions.  
However, when transactions are integrated within an organization, transaction-cost 
calculations must also include internal costs of managing, monitoring, and motivating activities 
and personnel, with low-powered incentives. Some key challenges of internal production 
previously discussed include sub-optimization, strategic internal lobbying for resources, 
multitasking, and the difficulty of coordinating and monitoring the quality, quantity, cost, 
timeliness and improvement of goods and services. 27  
It is instructive to return to OMB Circular A-76 and examine the threshold cost-savings 
criteria required to declare a victor in public-private competitions. The results of our analysis 
suggest the one-size-fits-all threshold of greater than 10% estimated production cost savings 
before a federal activity is out-sourced should be reviewed. In the case of what we termed 
“good” candidates for out-sourcing, the threshold production savings specified in OMB A-76 can 
be reduced considerably, since external transaction costs tend to be low or negligible. In 
contrast, for the “more challenging” candidates, the 10 percent or $10 million threshold of 
production cost savings might need to be raised to account for the likelihood of substantial 
external transaction costs required to govern the ongoing relationship—including scope for 
encouraging productive effort and discouraging unproductive bargaining (hold-ups and 
renegotiation). 
C. What It All Means in the Defense Sector 
The key contribution of this paper is to apply lessons from TCE to develop new insights 
into public-private competitions. This effort leads to two important policy recommendations. 
First, different rules should apply to different transactions to declare a victor in public-private 
competitions. Second, if the private sector wins, then the optimum choice of outsourcing 
contract depends on certain key characteristics of the transaction.28  
                                                
27 In the first interpretation of the model—an out-sourcing or external, bilateral, monopoly bargaining 
setting—we considered ex-post adaptation (bilateral negotiation) between parties to a transaction (based 
on various assumptions regarding the complexity, uncertainty, and degree of asset specificity involved in 
the transaction). In a second interpretation of the model—an in-sourcing or internal, bureaucratic 
(hierarchical) setting—productive and unproductive activities (monitoring and measurement, shirking, and 
rent-seeking, etc.) engaged in by a principal (the boss or internal customer) and agent (the worker or 
internal supplier) can be studied using the stylized game model developed earlier. 
28 These characteristics include: the extent of any relation-specific (site, human or physical) assets that 
might be required for the transaction, complexity (the degree of uncertainty about demand, quality, cost, 
etc.), frequency of the transaction, information (asymmetries), market structure, etc.  
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Transaction costs include all the costs of out-sourcing a product or service including: 
search, bargaining, contracting and enforcement costs. An organization can out-source in two 
ways: on the spot market or through short- or long-term contracts. The method chosen depends 
on some key characteristics of the transaction.  
Spot-market (“off-the-shelf”) purchases will minimize transaction costs if transactions 
involve buying standard inputs in competitive markets. Usually, these purchases require no 
relationship-specific investments in specific assets, so there is no hold-up problem. 
Transactions best governed by spot-market purchases typically involve a product or service that 
is: a) standard and well-defined, b) easy to measure (limited complexity, and mild information 
asymmetry and uncertainty regarding cost, quality and schedule), c) either occasionally or 
routinely used (although frequent and recurring purchases by other buyers occur in the 
marketplace), and d) is offered by multiple competing suppliers. In this case, spot-market 
purchases minimize transaction costs, and price and performance are driven by market forces, 
not through negotiations. 
However, even in the case of standard products and services, if transactions involve 
specialized investments by either the buyer or the seller, there is a hold-up problem. This could 
manifest itself as under-investment in specific assets or opportunistic behavior once those 
investments are in place. Understanding this ex ante, TCE recommends the buyer and seller try 
to reduce the likelihood of a hold-up (or minimize transaction costs) by adopting a short- or long-
term contract.  
The four main contract types specified for out-sourcing under OMB A-76 are: Sealed bid 
firm-fix price (Fixed Price = FP), Cost sharing and Incentive Fee (Cost Plus = C+), and time and 
materials (TM). Table 2 details the types of out-sourcing contracts under which the top 10 
military contractors operated over the period 1998-2003.  
Table 2. The Top 15 items DoD Outsourced from 1998 to 2003 
Category Cost ($bil) 
Research & Development 140.2 
Aircraft & Airframe Structural Components 86.5 
Professional, Administrative & Mgmt Support Services 73.6 
Construction of Structures & Facilities 42.4 
Equipment Maintenance, Repair & Rebuilding 42.4 
Maintenance & Repair of Real Property 34.4 
Data Processing & Telecom Services 33.0 
Ships, Small Craft, Pontoons and Floating Devices 31.2 
Communications and Detection Equipment 28.3 
Medical Services 24.6 
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Fuels, Oils and Lubricants 24.5 
Engines, Turbines and Components 23.3 
Guided Missiles 22.8 
Utilities, Food Service, Janitorial and Housekeeping 22.6 
Transportation, Travel and Relocation Services 18.1 
(Markison, 2004) 
If the Performance Work Statement (PWS) describing the desired product, service or 
project can be specified precisely (IFB), and there are no transaction-specific assets involved, 
then FP-type contracts have the benefit of creating cost-reducing incentives that reward the 
buyer through ex-ante competition between potential suppliers. In this case, FP contracting 
increases contractor incentives to invest in cost reduction, and ex-ante competition can transfer 
these cost-savings directly to the buyer. Since there are few unresolved issues, little or no costly 
renegotiation occurs ex-post.  
In contrast, if the Performance Work Statement (PWS) cannot be specified precisely 
(RFP) or there are significant specific assets involved in the transaction, then some surplus will 
be eroded by the threat of ex-post negotiation. This loss from bargaining activity is part of the 
cost of using a FP contract in this case. The more complex and uncertain the transaction, the 
less complete the PWS, the greater the cost in using FP, and the more attractive other 
contracting options become.  
However, Bajari and Tadelis (1999) demonstrate that providing cost incentives in a 
contract is more likely than not to lead to disagreements, spoiled relationships and ex-post 
friction in interpreting the outcomes. In fact, avoiding these frictions and reducing the 
advantages of renegotiation can be accomplished by investing in a more complete PWS, and by 
adopting alternative mechanisms (reputation, GOCO, etc.) to reduce the return from 
opportunistic behavior. 
TCE suggests that the degree of completeness of the PWS and the contract is an 
optimizing decision by both parties that reflects their trade-offs between an ex-ante investment 
in the PWS and contract design, and the potential ex-post cost of opportunistic renegotiation. 
Moreover, since the principal insight of TCE is that the choice of optimal governance structure 
depends on the characteristics of the transaction, the dual focus of any out-sourcing evaluation 
should be: a) to sort transactions into categories based on their principal characteristics (asset 
specificity, uncertainty, complexity, and frequency), and b) to evaluate the costs and 
consequences of alternative contracts, organizational structures and mechanisms available to 
govern those transactions. Table 3 attempts to do just that. 
D. An Out-sourcing Risk Assessment Method 
A thesis by Powell proposes a method for managers to assess the risks associated with 
a proposed out-sourcing action.  Basically, aspects of the new relationship are related to a 
stoplight scheme.  For example, if there is a high degree of asset specificity involved, there 
would be a red light in that category, and a higher degree of risk is indicated.  Powell intended 
the light scheme to increase visibility of areas where management attention is important, and 
where managers ought to focus their risk-reduction efforts. 
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That application is certainly valid, but there’s another wrinkle.  The study of Transactions 
Cost Economics indicates that risk-reduction measures (even if highly effective) are not risk-
elimination panaceas.  Accordingly, one can expect an overall out-sourcing action with a large 
number of assessed red and yellow lights will be more costly and risky during its execution, 
even with due diligence in risk reduction. 
What follows is a variation of Powell’s stoplight scheme. 
a. Asset Specificity. 
RED.  Source becomes specialized, with no close substitutes or competitors 
readily available.  Example: only qualified supplier for a specific, highly-
specialized task—such as suppliers of spare parts for aging weapon systems. 
GREEN.  Routine (non-specialized) goods or tasks; competitors or close 
substitutes readily available.  Example: purchase of standard commercial items, 
such as paper clips and other office supplies.   
b. Complexity. 
RED.  A large-scale task covering a large geographic area.  Complexity of task 
severely limits qualified bidders.  Example: large-scale, complex IT support; such 
as NMCI. 
GREEN.  A simple, routine task or standard product.  A large number of qualified 
bidders.  Example: office supplies. 
c. Length of Relationship. 
RED.  A long-term relationship, which strains ability to foresee problems during 
original contract negotiations.  Complexity and asset specificity exacerbate this 
problem.  Example: IT support, such as NMCI. 
GREEN.  Out-sourcing is a one-time transaction, or can be structured as a series 
of one-time transactions.  Example: purchase of office supplies. 
d. Frequency. 
RED.  Specialized, complex task or service from which there is significant 
learning-by-doing.  Incumbent contractor has significant competitive advantage 
over potential competitors.  Example: contract maintenance for specialized 
aircraft, such as E-4s. 
GREEN.  Routine, standard task, service or product, in which a number of firms 
have significant expertise.  Example: copy machine repair. 
e. Time Sensitivity. (added) 
RED.  Quick performance of task or delivery of product is essential for 
satisfactory performance.  Example: repair of combat aircraft, or warship 
subsystems. 
GREEN.  Quick delivery of products or accomplishment of task is not essential 
for satisfactory performance.  Satisfactory performance can include some delays.  
Example: copy machine repairs. 
f. Operational Significance. (added) 
RED.  Unsatisfactory performance significantly degrades operational capability or 
compromises safety.  Example: repair of combat aircraft or warship subsystems. 
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GREEN.  Unsatisfactory performance involves, at most, administrative 
inconvenience and longer time to accomplish routine tasks.  No compromise of 
operational readiness or safety.  Examples: delays in copy machine repairs and 
temporary lack of office supplies. 
Table 3 provides a brief summary of the scheme above.  Table 4 essays notional 
characterizations of three out-sourcing candidates.  
TABLE 3.  Assessing Like Nature of Transactions Costs 
CHARACTERISTICS DESCRIPTIONS 
 GREEN  YELLOW RED 
Market Structure: Supplier 
Power (post selection) 
Many Suppliers  One Supplier 
Nature of Tasks Simple, general  Complex, specialized 
Frequency of Tasks Occasional  Continuous 
Time Sensitivity: Implications 
of Late Performance 
Inconvenience  Lost Operational Capability or 
Compromised Safety 
Importance: Implications of 
Unsatisfactory Performance 
Inconvenience  Lost Operational Capability or 
Compromised Safety 
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TABLE 4.  Notional Assessments of Outsourcing Candidates 
Characteristics    
 Office Supplies Packing Parachutes 24/7 IT Service 
Market Structure: 
Supplier Power (post 
selection) 
GREEN: always a 










Nature of Tasks GREEN: simple RED: complex and 
specialized 
RED: complex and 
highly specialized 






























of safety and loss of 
operational 
capability 
RED: loss of 
operational 
capability 
Asset Specificity GREEN: none GREEN(?): little RED: significant 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS: ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL 
Transactions costs are not the only consideration for make-or-buy decisions. If that were 
so, then one might conclude the government should generally in-source production of complex 
weapon systems and out-source janitorial services. For good reasons, the opposite is the more 
typical practice.29 
The goal of this paper was to integrate and apply key principles of TCE that previously 
focused on the firm as a guide to government out-sourcing. TCE recognizes organizations enter 
into bilateral contracts with suppliers, workers, managers, customers, firms, and other 
organizations that require costly governance (coordination and incentive) mechanisms. In 
evaluating transactions for their “make-or-buy?” decisions, firms typically consider both 
production costs and the cost of managing transactions, or transaction costs. It is time for 
government to do the same.  
The implications of this paper suggest that in the case of out-sourcing a transaction 
where complexity, uncertainty and asset specificity can lead to renegotiation, the choice of 
                                                
 29 However, advocates of the arsenal system could argue (and have) that the hazards illuminated by TCE 
indicate production of some complex weapon systems should be done internally. 
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governance structure will drive productive effort and unproductive bargaining. Ideally, contracts 
can be written that specify measures of performance, conflict resolution procedures, and 
conditions under which the contract can be modified, as well as provisions for sharing gains 
from transaction-specific investments. In reality, the tradeoff (as it applies to out-sourcing) might 
be stated as follows. On the one hand, efforts to suppress opportunism contractually are limited 
by the costs of writing and enforcing contractual agreements; they rise with the complexity, 
uncertainty, and asset-specificity associated with the transaction. This works against out-
sourcing. On the other hand, while integration within the organization mitigates these problems, 
internal principal-agent issues arise that sacrifice the high-powered incentives of the market and 
consequently require greater monitoring and administrative costs. This works in favor of out-
sourcing.  
In summary, like private firms, government “make-or-buy?” decisions should look 
beyond production cost savings and forecast likely transaction costs associated with out-
sourcing. Moreover, government rules that prescribe particular contract types should be based 
on the four principal characteristics of transactions (asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity and 
frequency), and should offer contracts and mechanisms that encourage productive effort, 
protect transaction-specific investments, and discourage unproductive bargaining, influence and 
rent-seeking activities.  
Our central conclusion is indeed that one size does not fit all.  This has interesting 
implications both at the management and policy level.  Those managing competitive sourcing 
processes do well to keep in mind that not all A-76 competitions are the same.  The costs (direct 
and indirect), risks, and associated management attention that attend out-sourcing vary greatly 
with the nature of the goods and services under consideration.  Moreover, TCE tells a lot about 
the size of the transactions costs and risks associated with out-sourcing.  One implication 
affects the conduct of the A-76 competition.  Out-sourcing decisions that involve a lot of red and 
yellow lights (in Table 3) warrant more management attention up front.  In particular, managers 
should invest more in formulating Performance Work Statements and in drawing up the 
contract(s) which govern the relationship to include provisions for dispute resolution and 
contract renegotiation.  Avoiding large costs and management headaches later is worth some 
extra resources and management attention early on.  Moreover, both defense managers and 
contracting officers should vary contract types with the assessed nature of the out-sourcing 
action.  Thus, for example, purchase of standard office supplies are handled nicely with very 
simple, fixed-price contracts—while long-term IT services contracts entail much more complete 
and complex contracts with appropriate incentive and governance provisions. 
We should also recognize that one size does not fit all at the policy level,.  In a very real 
sense, the A-76 criteria include transaction-cost considerations because the out-sourcing 
proposal must beat the in-house proportion by a certain margin in order to get the contract.  
However, as TCE amply demonstrates, the likely size of transactions costs varies greatly.  
Moreover, those costs vary in an orderly fashion with respect to certain key characteristics 
we’ve discussed above.  It’s time to take this pattern into account.  The winning margin should 
vary according to the nature of the out-sourcing relationship being considered—more than the 
current A-76 standard for some, less for others.
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APPENDIX 
RELATION-SPECIFIC INVESTMENT AND POTENTIAL FOR HOLDUP: A HYPOTHETICAL 
EXAMPLE30 
Boutique Motor Corporation (BMC) features highly decorative cup holders in its 
automobiles.  General-purpose plastics suppliers can provide those unique cup holders for $4 
per unit.  BMC, however, forms a long-term relationship with Mom & Pop Plastic Fabricators 
(M&P) to get those cup holders at a cheaper price, say $3 per unit for 500,000 cup holders per 
year.  As part of its part of the relationship, M&P modifies (and specializes) its plastic molding 
machinery to make the distinctive BMC cup holder more efficiently.  M&P invests $1 million in 
the modifications, and can then produce each unit for $1 each.31  M&P’s modified plant can still 
produce general-purpose cup holders, but average variable cost goes up to $2.90 per unit with 
the special-purpose machinery.  The prevailing market price for general-purpose cup holders is 
$3 per unit. 
In this simple example, M&P’s costs are as follows: 
Total Cost = $140,000 + $1 * Q, 
where Q is annual production (500,000 for BMC), and annual payments of $140K will retire a 
debt of $1 million at 6.64% (APR) over ten years.  If M&P produces only for BMC, then total cost 
is $640,000.  Revenues from BMC are $1.5 million (500,000*3).   
Thus, M&P earns profits of $0.86 million per year as a result of the relationship with 
BMC; it would absorb losses of 90K per year if it diverted its production capacity to 500,000 
general-purpose cup holders.32  Likewise, BMC adds $0.5 million to its profits since it pays $3 
per unit for its cup holders, instead of $4 (500,000*[4-3]).  In short, the agreement provides 
significant benefits to both parties.  The total benefit (or “surplus”) is $1.45 million (.86+.09+.50) 
after the relationship between the two companies is formed. 
However, this total surplus can be contested.  Suppose BMC demands M&P lower its 
price to $2.  If that happens, then M&P’s profits decrease to $0.36 million (500,000*2 – 
640,000), and BMC’s profits increase by $0.5 million.  At the same time, M&P may insist on a 
                                                
30 Besanko (2000) has a similar example on page 153. 
31 Marginal Cost = Average Variable Cost = $1. 
32 Before making its relationship-specific investment (or prior to the transformation), M&P reckons its 
advantage as $0.86 million per year minus its profits as a general-purpose supplier.  After the investment, 
M&P’s benefit from the relationship with BMC is $.95 million per year with production of 500,000 per year.  
(If M&P were to produce those cup holders at variable costs of $2.90 per unit and sell them at $3.00, it 
would incur a loss of $90K per year [revenue = $1.50 million; cost = $1.59 million]). 
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price increase to $3.50 per unit.  If that happens, then M&P’s profit increases to $1.11 million 
and BMCs benefit declines to $0.25 million.33  In short, BMC and M&P can dispute shares of the 
total benefit from the relationship.34  As indicated, the standard term for such attempts to alter 
the relationship is “holdup.” 
 
                                                
33 It’s unlikely that a holdup by either party would be presented this crudely.  BMC might plead hard times 
and assert the need to negotiate lower prices from suppliers.  M&P might point to increases in input costs, 
and assert the need for a higher price in order to remain in its relationship with BMC. 
34 There are obvious limits to this behavior.  If M&P demands more than $4 for each cup holder, then 
BMC would find it advantageous to buy its cup holders from other sources (at $4).  Likewise, if BMC 
forces the price below $1.10, then M&P would choose to make general purpose cup holders and sell 
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